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A TRIP THROUGH THE MAZE OF
"CORPORATE DEMOCRACY':
SHAREHOLDER VOICE AND
MANAGEMENT COMPOSITION
THOMAS W. Joot
INTRODUCTION
According to a common American myth, shareholders govern
corporations through a process of corporate democracy. Even the
Supreme Court labors under this misconception. 1  In fact,
corporate law gives the board of directors power to manage the
corporation and authorizes them to delegate much of this power
to executives whom they appoint. Moreover, corporate law also
limits shareholders' ability to choose and elect directors; instead,
it gives directors themselves primary control over board
membership. 2 This Symposium explores the intersection of race
and corporate law. In light of the great power of corporate
directors and executives, the lack of diversity in their ranks is a
salient issue. This Article assesses the potential for
shareholders to use their voice in corporate governance to
increase diversity in upper management. The Article pays
particular attention to corporate governance reforms proposed or
enacted in response to the recent rash of corporate scandals such
t Professor, University of California, Davis, School of Law. This Article was
prepared for the 2003 St. John's University School of Law Ronald H. Brown Center
for Civil Rights and Economic Development/Northeast People of Color Legal
Scholarship Conference. An earlier version was presented at the 2003 Western Law
Teachers of Color/Conference of Asian Pacific American Law Faculty Joint
Conference. I would like to thank the organizers of and participants in both those
conferences. Charles Yu and Wendy Motooka provided indispensable research
assistance for this Article. This Article was supported by a research grant from the
UC Davis School of Law. © 2003 Thomas W. Joo.
I See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978); Thomas
W. Joo, The Modern Corporation and Campaign Finance: Incorporating Corporate
Governance Analysis into First Amendment Jurisprudence, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 28
(2001).
2 See infra Parts II.B, III.C.
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as the collapse of the Enron Corporation. The new measures
hardly usher in a golden age of shareholder empowerment, but
they may provide some useful tools for shareholder activists.
Part I of this Article discusses the lack of diversity among
corporate directors and the executive officers they appoint.
Although American corporations have recently made numerous
pronouncements in favor of diversity, they have been slow to
diversify their highest ranks. People of color make up a growing
proportion of corporations' labor force but not of their directorial
and executive class. Part I also introduces various arguments
that diversity is not only a racial justice issue but also
contributes to better management decision making and greater
shareholder wealth.
The insulated, homogeneous oligarchies of corporate boards
may pose special obstacles to diversity. Part II discusses the
tendency of these types of institutions to perpetuate their own
homogeneity. It then goes on to explain how corporate law
empowers directors to control the makeup of the board. The
doctrine of unilateral director power over board composition
reduces the likelihood that questions will be raised about the
behavioral bias toward homogeneity and thus helps perpetuate
the cycle of homogeneity.
As Professor Ramirez points out in this Symposium, the
governments of Norway and Israel have addressed the issue of
gender imbalance on corporate boards by requiring a minimum
number of women board members.3 The merits of such a system
aside, it is unlikely that the United States will impose similar
legal requirements in the foreseeable future. The Supreme
Court's recent opinion on affirmative action specifically rejected
diversity quotas as unconstitutional in public university
admissions. 4 Moreover, as a general matter, corporate board
composition is typically characterized as a private law matter
between shareholders and management. As a result, corporate
law purports to limit itself to procedure rather than substance.
Against this legal and political background, government-
mandated quotas for business corporations are hardly likely.
3 Steven A. Ramirez, A Flaw in the Sarbanes Oxley Reform: Can Diversity in
the Boardroom Quell Corporate Corruption? 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 837, 861-62
(2003).
4 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2439-40 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger,
123 S. Ct. 2325, 2342 (2003).
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Thus diversity activists cannot reasonably expect any significant
legal mandates concerning corporate board composition. They
will most likely have to seek change through the exercise of
shareholder voice in individual corporations. Many governance
reforms have been enacted or are under consideration in
response to the current stock market slump, the Enron scandal,
and similar disasters. Even as the political climate becomes
relatively amenable to regulation, however, race remains taboo.
Thus, the only realistic potential for achieving diversity lies in
navigating, and perhaps reforming, the race neutral procedural
rules governing the shareholder role in corporate governance. 5
As Part II.B explains, the traditional corporate governance
regime is heavily slanted in favor of management continuity and
discourages active shareholder involvement in choosing board
members. Part III examines various ways in which shareholders
might attempt to push for board diversity under the traditional
corporate governance system, recent reforms, and recently
proposed reforms. Recent and pending reforms include board
independence requirements imposed under the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, similar requirements proposed by the New York Stock
Exchange, and proxy voting reform proposed by the Securities
and Exchange Commission. Part III reviews and critiques the
potential of these reforms to increase shareholder voice generally
and particularly in the context of attempts to increase diversity
on corporate boards. The new reforms do not promise any
earthshaking changes, but they may provide some increased
opportunities for the exercise of shareholder voice in board
composition.
5 This Article focuses on corporate law, though employment discrimination law
may hold some potential. Discrimination lawsuits by executives or potential board
candidates would be unlikely "not only because they are so difficult to win and
impossible to finance, but also because any potential plaintiff is afraid of being
negatively affected in her search for jobs elsewhere." Martha S. West, Gender Bias
in Academic Robes: The Law's Failure to Protect Women Faculty, 67 TEMP. L. REV.
67, 156 (1994) (critiquing the treatment of women plaintiffs in the university
context). If boards' conduct rises to the level of illegal discrimination, however,
it may give shareholders a cause of action. See Leonard Baynes, Racial Stereotypes,
Broadcast Corporations, and the Business Judgment Rule, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 819,
872 (2003). Whether employment discrimination law applies to corporate director
nominations is an unsettled question beyond the scope of this Article.
2003]
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I. THE LACK OF DIVERSITY IN UPPER MANAGEMENT
Corporate America has been singing the praises of diversity
of late. Corporate support for affirmative action in the recent
Grutter and Gratz Supreme Court cases was perhaps the most
high-profile example. 6 A recent study by the Conference Board-
a group of the business world's ultra-elite-found that corporate
executives and investors alike claimed to believe that diversity is
"a key part of good governance." 7 The sincerity of the corporate
commitment to diversity is, however, open to doubt. While
America's workforce is rapidly becoming browner, America's
corporate boardrooms and executive suites are not.
While Grutter and Gratz were before the Court, sixty-five
major domestic corporations, including 3M, Boeing, Microsoft,
and Nike, submitted an amicus brief in support of the University
of Michigan's affirmative action policies. The brief argued that
diversity in higher education is a compelling government
interest because of the "crucial role [it] plays in preparing
students to be the leaders this country needs in business, law,
and all other pursuits that affect the public interest."8 In short,
the corporations argued that diversity in higher education
improves the diversity and quality of the labor pool.
The corporate amicus brief celebrated the minority
composition of Microsoft's work force; it stated that the minority
composition of Microsoft's workforce has expanded from 16.8% to
25.6% between 1997 and 2003. The brief did not say, however,
whether minority workers at Microsoft are represented across
the spectrum of positions or whether they are disproportionately
assigned to low-wage jobs, as they generally are in the economy.
As one commentator writes, "African Americans with the same
level of education as whites continue to earn substantially less.
Blacks continue to occupy proportionally fewer managerial
positions and proportionally greater service and unskilled labor
positions." 9
6 See Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Businesses in Support of
Respondents, Grutter, Gratz (Nos. 02-241 and 02-516) [hereinafter Amicus Brief].
7 Lynne L. Dallas, The New Mangerialism and Diversity on Corporate Boards of
Directors, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1363, 1385 (2001).
8 Amicus Brief, supra note 6, at 2.
9 Christopher A. Bracey, Thinking Race, Making Nation, 97 Nw. U. L. REV.
911, 917-18 (2003) (reviewing GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL
INEQUALITY (Harvard Univ. Press 2002)) (citing Loury's data).
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In 2002, African Americans made up about 10.9% of the
overall workforce of the United States but only about 8% of the
information technology (IT) workforce. 10  Moreover, among
blacks in the IT workforce, approximately 39% held
administrative positions such as data entry keyer or computer
operator, rather than highly skilled jobs that involve
programming, engineering, or research.11  The figure was
roughly the same for Hispanics but only 22% for whites. 12
Moreover, the amicus brief did not say anything about
diversity among the directors and top executives of Microsoft or
any other corporation. Job opportunities for minorities is of
course desirable. Celebrating labor diversity while ignoring
director and executive diversity, however, is not only hypocritical
but also ominous. The glass ceiling for professionals obviously
does not implicate issues of poverty and survival, but it does
raise issues of distributive justice. To some extent, the browning
of the workforce, especially the less-skilled sector, is attributable
to the fact that employers can pay lower wages to nonwhite
immigrants from developing countries, and a primarily white
executive class governs this increasingly brown labor class.
Of course, it is commonly argued that corporations should be
more concerned about shareholder value than social justice, but
even those who value corporate earnings more than racial
fairness should be concerned about executive and board
diversity. If diversity contributes to a more productive workforce,
as corporations seem to acknowledge, it seems to follow that it
should also make for good leadership. One recent empirical
study found that increased firm value correlates with board
diversity.13 Based on an extensive review of organizational
10 Report of the ITAA Blue Ribbon Panel on IT Diversity, Presented at the
National IT Workforce Convocation, at 12, http://www.itaa.org/workforce/docs/
03divreport.pdf (May 5, 2003) [hereinafter ITAA Report].
11 Id. at 13 tbl.3.
12 Id.
13 See David A. Carter et al., Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and Firm
Value, 38 FIN. REV. 33, 50-51 (2003). But see Dallas, supra note 7, at 1403 n.181.
Dallas notes:
Studies of corporate boards of directors that seek to correlate gender and
ethnicity to corporate performance are not very useful because most corporate
boards, which contain twelve members on average, usually have only one female or
minority member who is unlikely to be able to influence significantly board decision
making.
Id.
2003]
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behavior scholarship, Lynne Dallas has cited several advantages
to heterogeneous boards. 14 Dallas argues that heterogeneous
groups, by bringing together a wide range of viewpoints, excel in
"complex decision making requiring creativity and judgment."15
Diverse directors may also engage in more rigorous decision
making and monitoring processes because of their varying and
sometimes conflicting perspectives. 16 For example, they may be
more likely to actively monitor one another, 17 to make decisions
by considered discussion and negotiation rather than by
consensus,' 8 and to consider counterarguments.' 9 They may be
less likely to be overconfident 20 and less likely to take extreme
positions. All these tendencies toward greater care are
particularly relevant concerns in the wake of the Enron collapse
and related scandals, as well as the dot.com meltdown that
preceded them. Yet diversity continues to lag.
Take Microsoft again, for example. Microsoft's website has
photos of its eight directors, six of whom appear to be white men,
one of whom appears to be a white woman, and one of whom
appears to be a black man. 2' Its website has biographies of
ninety-six executives, with photos for eighty-four of them. The
vast majority appear to be white men. There are nine who
appear to be racial minorities, all of them apparently of East
Asian, South Asian, or Arab descent, 22 except for one senior vice
president. 23
14 Dallas, supra note 7, at 1388-1405.
15 Id. at 1391.
16 See id. at 1399-1403.
17 See id. at 1400-01.
18 See id. at 1401.
19 See id. at 1402.
20 See id.
21 See Microsoft Press Pass: Information for Journalists, Microsoft Board of
Directors, at http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/bod/default.asp (Sept. 16, 2002).
Of course, visual identification is an imperfect method of racial identification. See,
e.g., KEVIN R. JOHNSON, How DID You GET TO BE MEXICAN? A WHITE/BROWN
MAN'S SEARCH FOR IDENTITY (1999); GREGORY H. WILLIAMS, LIFE ON THE COLOR
LINE: THE TRUE STORY OF A WHITE BOY WHO DISCOVERED HE WAS BLACK (1995).
22 See Microsoft Press Pass: Information for Journalists, Microsoft Executives,
at http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/exec/default.asp (Aug. 15, 2003). With
respect to some of these individuals, it is unclear whether they are Asian Americans
or foreign nationals directing foreign operations.
23 This executive, Orlando Ayala, is identified in a news story on his biography
page as 'Microsoft's highest-ranking Hispanic executive." See Microsoft Press Pass:
Information for Journalists, Microsoft Executive Encourages Hispanic Students to
Explore High-Tech Careers, at http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/features
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I choose Microsoft as an example here not because
Microsoft's board and management are especially lagging in
terms of diversity but because the Grutter amicus brief touts the
firm's diverse workforce. Indeed, Microsoft's upper echelon is
actually among the more diverse in corporate America. As
Professor Ramirez points out in this Symposium, African
Americans and Latinos make up 30% of the population of the
United States but only 4.1% of the directors of Fortune 1000
corporations. 24 According to Forbes.com, about 5% of corporate
directors are black. Furthermore, about 90% of Fortune 1000
senior executives are white men. 25
The number of people of color involved at the board level is
even lower than these figures suggest because a small pool of
individuals occupy the "minority seat" on multiple corporate
boards. The average white director serves on 1.7 boards, while
the average non-white director serves on 2.2 boards.26 One
important recruiter of director and executive candidates believes
that major American corporations think these few individuals
are "the only qualified minority candidates to do the job." 27 Two
African Americans, Shirley Jackson, the president of Rensselaer
Polytechnic Institute, and William Gray III, president of the
United Negro College Fund, each sit on eight boards, more than
any other individual, black or white. 28 This overlap not only
means that diversity on corporate boards is overstated but also
suggests that many directors of color are mere figureheads who
are too overextended to play a significant role in corporate
management. Institutional investors have leveled this charge at
Washington insider Vernon Jordan, 29 who sits on a long list of
/1998/1l-6ayala.asp (Nov. 6, 1998).
24 Ramirez, supra note 3 (citing Gary Strauss, Good Old Boys' Network Still
Rules Corporate Boards; Ethnic Members Scarce, and Gains Happen Slowly, USA
TODAY, Nov. 1, 2002, at B1).
25 Id.
26 Dan Ackman, Black Directors: Diversity Without Diversity, FORBES.COM
(Aug. 8, 2002) (citing a study by the Investor Responsibility Research Center), at
http://www.forbes.comfhome/2002/08/08/O808blackdirectors.html (last visited Sept.
30, 2003).
27 Pepi Sappal, Employers Fight Over Minority M.B.A. Grads, C. J. FROM THE
WALL STREET J. (Apr. 5, 2001) (quoting Ginny Clarke, head of the diversity practice
at Spencer Stuart, a leading director and executive search firm),
http://www.collegejournal.com/successwork/workplacediversity/20010405sappal.htm
1 (last visited Sept. 30, 2003).
28 Ackman, supra note 26.
29 Marc Fisher, First Friend, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 1998, at El.
2003]
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major boards including Dow Jones, American Express, and
Xerox. 30 As one critic quipped, "Jordan is so busy that having
him on your board suggests that at least one director will not be
in a position to cause you any trouble."3' 1
Furthermore, corporate reliance on a tiny pool of minority
directors may reduce the value of minority directors. Although a
minority director may be especially qualified to inject racial
sensitivity into corporate decision making, she may be unable to
have an effect if she is the only person of color on the board.
Boards often have only one minority member. Without a critical
mass of persons of color on the board, a lone diverse perspective
may be drowned out or ignored by a chorus of homogenous
voices. 32
II. FACTORS MILITATING AGAINST MANAGEMENT DIVERSITY
A. Homogeneity Begets Homogeneity
It might be argued that due to the competitive pressure of
the marketplace, corporations are forced to seek out the best
directors and executives. Thus, it might be expected that
pointing out the material benefits of diversity would lead
directors to pursue diversity on their own. The organizational
literature on the benefits of heterogeneous groups has long been
available, however, and it has had little effect on diversity.
It is unrealistic to expect boards to see the light and
diversify themselves. Homogeneous institutions tend to
replicate themselves with homogeneous successors. In her
classic study of the corporate power structure, Rosabeth Kanter
explained homogeneity as a basis for trust in an uncertain
corporate world. Placing someone in a managerial position
means placing trust in that person's discretion and thereby
creating certainty. In the corporate world, individuals lack
significant personal knowledge of one another and thus tend to
base their trust on "outward manifestations."33  As Kanter
writes:
It is the uncertainty quotient in managerial work.., that
30 Most Powerful Black Executives, FORTUNE (Jul. 22, 2002), available at http://
www.fortune.com/fortune/blackpower (last visited Sept. 30, 2003).
31 Fisher, supra note 29 (quoting business school professor Graef Crystal).
32 See Dallas, supra note 7, at 1403-05.
33 ROSABETH Moss KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 48 (1977).
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causes management to become so socially restricting: to develop
tight inner circles excluding social strangers; to keep control in
the hands of socially homogeneous peers; to stress
conformity... and to prefer ease of communication and thus
social certainty over the strains of dealing with people who are
"different."
... The greater the uncertainty, the greater the pressures
for those who have to trust each other to form a homogenous
group.34
In less formal terms, "'[g]etting on a board is like being
invited into a secret club .... There's a collegiality that's
required, so you aren't going to be invited in unless you've
demonstrated that you can work within the system and the
club.' "35
Although heterogeneity can enhance group decision making,
it can also undermine the cohesiveness of a group. 36 Despite
potential long-term gains from workplace diversity, behavioral
research also suggests, rather unsurprisingly, that individuals
are attracted to, and more likely to trust, persons whom they
perceive to be similar. Race is one of the characteristics that
define similarity. 37 Lynne Dallas suggests that effective groups
require a balance between the spark provided by heterogeneous
viewpoints and the group cohesiveness provided by
homogeneity. 38
Recent corporate law scholarship has applied the theme of
trust in the context of upper management 39 but has not applied
34 Id. at 49.
35 Gary Strauss, Good Old Boys' Network Still Rules Corporate Boards; Ethnic
Members Scarce, and Gains Happen Slowly, USA TODAY, Nov. 1, 2002, at B1. The
"club" metaphor for boards is telling since private clubs can be egregious bastions of
discrimination. See Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL.
L. REV. 1279, 1317-21 (1987); National Council of Women's Organizations, Hall of
Hypocrisy (providing information on discriminatory membership policies of Augusta
National Golf Club), at http://www.augustadiscriminates.org (last visited Sept. 23,
2003).
36 See Dallas, supra note 7, at 1393; Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law
and Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1797-98 (2003) (book
review).
37 Carbado & Gulati, supra note 36, at 1795-96.
38 Dallas, supra note 7, at 1393-94.
39 See generally Carbado & Gulati, supra note 36, at 1789 (citing Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55
VAND. L. REV. 1 (2002); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production
Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999); Neal Kumar Katyal,
2003]
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it critically to the lack of racial diversity among directors and
executives. Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati, however, have
applied it in the related context of employment law. They argue
that the pursuit of a harmonious atmosphere may contribute to
racial bias in hiring and other employment practices.40 Carbado
and Gulati posit that despite the benefits of diversity, managers
may prefer racial homogeneity because they tend to be short-run
oriented, and homogeneity makes it easier to establish group
cohesiveness in the short-run. 41 Similar reasoning may apply to
corporate boards, particularly as investor demand for short-run
performance has increased in recent years.
To the extent that homogeneity breeds homogeneity,
director homogeneity contributes to executive homogeneity
because directors control the appointment of executive officers.
In addition, director homogeneity perpetuates itself in two ways.
First, the corporate executives appointed by the board make up
the pool of the firm's inside director candidates and also
dominate the outside directorships for other corporations. 42
Second, and more directly, incumbent directors choose their
successors in most situations. This will be explained below.
This closed system sets up a cycle of homogenous self-replication,
whether conscious or unconscious.
B. Director Control over Board Elections and Executive
Appointments
The formal structure of corporate governance envisions a
kind of republican democracy in which shareholders vote for
directors. If shareholders elect directors, how does directors' bias
toward homogeneity determine the composition of the board?
Despite the formal trappings of "corporate democracy," directors
have far more power over election outcomes than shareholders
Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307 (2003); Donald C. Langevoort, The Human
Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of
Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797 (2001)).
40 See id. at 1789-90.
41 Id. at 1793-94.
42 The majority of outside directors at major corporations are top executives
from other major corporations. See JAY W. LORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS
OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA'S CORPORATE BOARDS 18 (1989); Charles
M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-Captured Board-The
History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. REV. 127, 158 n.117 (1996); Laura
Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism:
Theories and Evidence, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 898, 915 n.93 (1996).
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do. 43 At election time, the incumbent board typically nominates
a slate of candidates without input from shareholders.
Furthermore, the management slate usually runs unopposed. As
will be discussed in detail below, corporate law discourages
shareholders from mounting opposition campaigns. 44
Without a choice of candidates, a dissatisfied shareholder
may choose to withhold her vote on the slate, but she cannot cast
a vote against incumbent directors. 45 Withholding one's vote is a
futile gesture because election to the board does not require a
majority vote of shareholders but only a plurality of the votes
cast once a quorum is met.46 Thus, in an uncontested election,
the incumbent board's nominees are guaranteed to be elected,
regardless of the number of votes withheld by shareholders. 47 In
short, "shareholders in public corporations do not in any realistic
sense elect boards. Rather, boards elect themselves."48
The recent wave of corporate scandals has given rise to
many attempts to reform corporate governance. Some of the
proposed and actual reforms may chip away at the entrenchment
of incumbent directors and increase board turnover over the next
few years. Some commentators believe the increased turnover
could create opportunities for minority board candidates. 49 For
example, under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and proposed NYSE rule
changes, directors will have to meet enhanced requirements of
independence and financial expertise. One study of Fortune
1000 corporations found that as the number of inside
directors-directors who are also officers of that corporation-on a
corporation's board increases, the proportion of women and
43 See Joo, supra note 1, at 44-45.
44 See infra Part III.c.2.
45 See Joo, supra note 1, at 44.
46 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3) (2001). Unless otherwise specified in the
corporate charter or bylaws, a majority of shares constitutes a quorum. See § 216(1).
47 See SEC Div. OF CORP. FIN., STAFF REPORT: REVIEW OF THE PROXY PROCESS
REGARDING THE NOMINATION AND ELECTION OF DIRECTORS 12 (2003) [hereinafter
SEC STAFF REPORT]. Proxy cards for corporate elections typically allow
shareholders to check a box authorizing the corporation to cast the shareholders'
votes "for" the corporate nominees or to check a box marked "withhold vote." They
do not offer the option of voting "no." Indeed, in an uncontested election, submitting
a proxy card marked "withhold vote" is probably counterproductive, since its only
effect is to validate the election by helping to establish a quorum. Refusing to return
a proxy card at all might foil a quorum but could be interpreted by management as
indifference, rather than opposition.
48 Blair & Stout, supra note 39, at 311.
49 See Strauss, supra note 35.
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minorities on the board decreases.50 This suggests that the new
rules requiring outside directors may increase the number of
minority directors. 51
In theory, board turnover may create opportunities for
minority directors. These particular reforms, however, will
probably have only a limited effect on turnover. For example,
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires corporations to have an audit
committee made up of independent directors. 52 Most of
America's major corporations already have independent audit
committees, however, because the NYSE and NASDAQ already
impose the same requirement. 53 Because the exchange rules are
stricter than those in the securities laws, they are more likely to
have an effect on turnover. The NYSE has proposed a stricter
definition of directorial "independence," as well as a requirement
that the majority of the entire board be independent. 54 The
NYSE proposal also requires boards to establish, independent
compensation and nominating committees. 55 The actual effect of
these rule changes on turnover is unclear, however. According to
the Investor Responsibility Research Center, over 85% of
corporations in the S&P 1500 have majority-independent
boards. 56 The extent of the turnover effect will depend on how
many of these currently independent directors will fail to satisfy
the NYSE's new definition.
50 See Carter et al., supra note 13, at 50. This is, of course, consistent with the
dearth of high-ranking minority executives.
51 See id. Note, for example, that neither Shirley Jackson nor William Gray III,
America's most sought-after directors, is a business executive.
52 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(m) (West 2002).
53 NASD MANUAL § 4350(d)(2) (2002); NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL
§ 303.01(B)(2) (1999).
54 NYSE CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND LISTING STANDARDS COMMITTEE
REP. 6-8 (2002), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/corp-govreport.pdf
[hereinafter NYSE REPORT].
55 Id. at 9-11.
56 Press Release, Investor Responsibility Research Center, Structural Changes
Likely for Many Boards, IRRC Finds (Nov. 18, 2002), available at
http://www.irrc.org/company/ 11182002_Boards.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2003).
In September 2003, after publication of the NYSE Report but before adoption of any
reforms, NYSE Chairman and CEO Richard Grasso was forced out due to
controversy over his compensation package. See Jack Lynch, Grasso Leaves After
Furor Over Pay, New York Times, Sept, 17, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/
2003/09/17/business/17WIREEMEG.html?ex=1064842182&ei=l&en=ae5l5be5b9ad
31c9. The public criticism generated by this scandal may lead the NYSE to institute
more aggressive reforms than those recommended by the NYSE Report.
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Moreover, while turnover and independence requirements
will create opportunities, they will not necessarily lead to greater
diversity by themselves. As long as incumbent boards retain
control of the nomination process, homogeneous boards will
continue to fill vacancies with replicas of themselves. The only
specific reform currently pending that directly addresses the
nomination process is the NYSE's proposed requirement of a
nominating committee made up exclusively of independent
directors. 57 Shareholders seeking corporate reform should not,
however, place excessive reliance on independent directors.
Incumbent independent directors are likely to renominate
themselves, and there is no strong reason to believe that they
will replace incumbent inside directors in the interest of
diversity. Director independence does not guarantee fidelity to
shareholder interests as a general matter,58 and it certainly does
not guarantee greater sensitivity to diversity concerns.
III. POTENTIAL TOOLS FOR CHANGE
A. Corporate Law Litigation
It is unlikely that shareholders have a cause of action
against directors who fail to diversify the board. A fundamental
principle of state corporate law holds that directors, not
shareholders, manage the corporation. Delaware's General
Corporation Law, for example, states that "[t]he business and
affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors."59
Thus, even if a majority of shareholders were to demand that the
board nominate a more diverse slate of director candidates, the
demand would be unenforceable.
As noted above, many organizational theorists and
commentators have argued that diversity improves corporate
performance. Directors' failure to maximize corporate
performance, however, does not by itself give shareholders a
cause of action. Directors owe a duty of care to shareholders.
57 NYSE REPORT, supra note 54, at 9. As will be discussed below, the SEC has
proposed increasing shareholder's ability to nominate directors. See infra Part
IV.c.2.
58 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Shareholder Access to the Ballot, Bus. LAW.
(forthcoming 2003), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olincenter/.
59 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001).
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Although this duty of care is sometimes said to incorporate a
"duty" to enrich shareholders, this "duty" is largely
unenforceable. 60 The duty of care is qualified by the so called
business judgment rule. Under this rule, courts do not evaluate
directors' business decisions under ordinary negligence
principles but under a more deferential standard. 61
The business judgment rule is often interpreted to mean
that shareholders may not attack the substance of directors'
business decisions but may only question the board's decision-
making procedures. Smith v. Van Gorkom, one of the leading
cases on the issue, requires directors to inform themselves before
making business decisions. 62 Leonard Baynes has advocated an
aggressive approach to the duty of care in diversity issues based
on this requirement. Baynes argues that directors of broadcast
corporations might be liable for breach of the duty of care for
failing to provide more programming that features and is aimed
at minorities. According to Baynes, the boards' decisions not to
create minority programming do not deserve the protection of
the business judgment rule because neither directors nor the
officers and employees on whom they relied had fully informed
themselves about the value of the minority broadcast audience. 63
It is difficult to predict the success of duty of care litigation.
Baynes's argument may be logical, but the case law applying the
duty of care and business judgment rule is less so. 64 Courts only
rarely find directors liable for breaches of the duty of care.65
Recent case law has been encouraging, however. The Delaware
Court of Chancery recently found that plaintiffs sufficiently
pleaded a breach of the duty of care where they alleged facts
suggesting that the directors failed to "act in good faith and meet
minimal proceduralist standards of attention. '66 In that case,
60 See Joo, supra note 1, at 68-74; Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment
Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided Notion? 67 S.CAL.L.REV. 287 (1994).
61 FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 278-79 (2000).
62 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
63 Baynes, supra note 5, at 875. Cf. Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity in the
Boardroom, 6 STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN. 85, 128 (2000) ("The board has a duty to
exercise ordinary care in overseeing the corporation. This duty, quite clearly,
encompasses diversity management.").
64 See, e.g., GEVURTZ, supra note 61, at 279 (stating that "the phrase 'the
business judgment rule' has a number of different, and conflicting, meanings").
65 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 278 (Del. Ch.
2003).
66 Id.
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Disney shareholders made a series of specific factual allegations
regarding hasty and uninformed decision making in connection
with the compensation and termination of Michael Ovitz as
company president. According to the court, "Allegations that
Disney's directors abdicated all responsibility to consider
appropriately an action of material importance to the corporation
puts directly in question whether the board's decision-making
processes were employed in a good faith effort to advance
corporate interests."67
The Disney case provides useful guidance for shareholders
who might try to craft a pleading adapting Baynes's argument to
the board diversity context. An allegation of breach of care
requires specific factual allegations. The original complaint in
Disney was filed in 1997.68 The Delaware Supreme Court
dismissed the original complaint, calling it a "pastiche of prolix
invective" but instructed the trial court to allow plaintiffs to
amend the complaint with more factual specificity.69  The
plaintiffs then exercised their state-law right of access to the
corporate books and records 70 where they found the facts that
finally allowed them to state a cognizable claim. In allowing the
amended complaint to go forward, the trial court admonished
that the plaintiffs could have avoided the "expensive and time-
consuming procedural machinations" had they sought access to
corporate books and records before filing the original
complaint.71
Delaware and many other states also require a shareholder
filing a derivative lawsuit to show that she first demanded that
the directors bring the cause of action on behalf of the
corporation or that such a demand would have been a futile
gesture.72 Making a demand for board action is an ill-advised
move because if the board rejects it and opposes the
shareholder's suit, which is likely, shareholders will have limited
ability to challenge that decision.7 3  Thus shareholders'
complaints must show the futility of making a demand.
67 Id.
68 See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 248 n.1 (Del. 2000).
69 See id. at 249, 267.
70 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (2001).
71 In re Walt Disney Co., 825 A.2d at 279 n.5.
72 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 807-08 (Del. 1984); see also DEL. CH.
Rule 23.1.
73 See Scattered Corp. v. Chicago Stock Exch., 701 A.2d 70, 74 (Del. 1997).
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Establishing futility requires pleading specific facts suggesting
that the directors could not have impartially evaluated a demand
or that the action complained of did not deserve the protections
of the business judgment rule. The Disney court found that
plaintiffs met this requirement. The allegations suggested such
a cavalier attitude by directors as to raise doubts that they acted
"honestly and in good faith" as required by the business
judgment rule.74 Furthermore, the carelessness of the directors
was so severe as to suggest that the directors did not "exercise
any business judgment."75
Finally, Disney addresses the issue of corporate charter
provisions exempting directors from personal monetary liability
for breaches of due care. Statutes in Delaware and other states
explicitly permit corporate charters to include such exculpation
provisions. 76  They do not prevent plaintiffs from obtaining
injunctive relief, but effective injunctions may be hard to craft
and enforce, so monetary penalties are certainly a useful tool to
encourage future reform. In Disney, the court found that the
directors' lack of good faith suggested that they were not entitled
to protection under the statutory exculpation provision. 77
Like the Disney plaintiffs, shareholders seeking to
characterize a board's nomination process as a breach of the duty
of care will need specific facts about the decision-making process.
Thus it will be particularly important to exercise the state law
right of access to corporate books and records. The minutes of
meetings approving nominations will be particularly important.
Plaintiffs might attempt to satisfy the demand futility
requirement and avoid statutory exculpation of directors by
establishing a lack of good faith through the cavalier attitudes of
the directors with respect to diversity issues. With respect to
establishing the underlying breach of due care, the Disney case
suggests that gaps in the minutes can be damning: the court
pointed out that according to the minutes, the directors had
failed to ask questions about important issues.78 Taking a cue
from the Disney decision, shareholders should make an issue of
74 In re Walt Disney Co., 825 A.2d at 286.
7- Id. at 278.
76 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).
77 In re Walt Disney Co., 825 A.2d at 290.
78 Id. at 279-81.
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the lack of attention paid to the diversity issue in nomination
proceedings.
In addition to corporate books and records, proposed changes
to the SEC's proxy rules, if enacted, might yield additional
information. The proposal would require enhanced corporate
disclosure with respect to the director-nomination process. 79
While much of this disclosure might be excessively general, self-
serving boilerplate, the proposal also requires a board's
nominating committee to justify its decision if it fails to
nominate a shareholder-recommended candidate.80  This
provision would only apply to nominees recommended by a
shareholder or group of shareholders who have owned over three
percent of the company's stock for at least one year.81
A potential stumbling block to a duty of care cause of action
is that material harm to the corporation caused by a lack of
management diversity is much less clear than it was in Disney.
In Disney, the directors failed to inform themselves about
excessive compensation and separation terms that were
obviously costly to the corporation. Despite the evidence
showing that diversity is beneficial, it is nearly impossible to
demonstrate precisely the nature and degree of harm caused by
a lack of diversity. In addition, as noted above, there are
arguably some countervailing benefits to board homogeneity.
It is not entirely clear, however, whether a showing of
concrete harm is a prerequisite for a finding of liability. In the
earlier Van Gorkom case, for example, the court found a breach
of due care, even though there was no clear finding of harm. In
that case, the court found that the board had not exercised
procedural due care in recommending to shareholders that they
accept a buyout price of $55 per share. In addition, the court
found that the board had failed to disclose to shareholders its
deficient procedure for reaching the recommendation. The
directors argued that regardless of the procedures they used to
reach the $55 price, the result was fair in substance because the
price was fair to the shareholders. The court rejected this
79 See Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and
Communications Between Security Holders and Board of Directors, Release Nos.
34-48301; lc-26145, 68 Fed. Reg. 48.724 (2003). As of this writing (October 16,
2003), the proposed rules had not been adopted.
80 Id.
81 Id.
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argument without explanation, found the board in breach, and
remanded the case for a hearing on damages.8 2 A later Delaware
Supreme Court opinion explained that the substantive fairness
of price in Van Gorkom could not save the directors from liability
when they had committed "compound breaches of the duties of
care and disclosure."83 In a suit based on failure to nominate
directors of color, it may be difficult to show the amount of
damages with any specificity. This may preclude the imposition
of monetary judgments against directors.8 4  Nonetheless,
directors may still be found liable if the court finds "compound
breaches" of the sort found in Van Gorkom, which would entitle
shareholders to injunctive relief.
Shareholder demands for corporate records regarding
nominations may lead boards to lend more attention to diversity
matters in meetings. These demands may have an effect on
directors, even if litigation is unsuccessful or never occurs. The
SEC disclosure proposal may have a similar effect but a stronger
disclosure requirement mandating detailed descriptions of all
nomination proceedings would be preferable. Because of the
inherent subjectivity involved in the evaluation of director
candidates, directors could easily explain the rejection of a
shareholder nominee with a boilerplate statement that the
directors found another candidate who was more highly
qualified.
B. Exercising Shareholder Voice Through Shareholder
Proposals
Shareholder lawsuits are the bluntest instruments in the
toolbox of corporate governance. These lawsuits can be
extremely costly, lengthy, and potentially disruptive to the
corporation. Shareholder voting offers some less drastic, though
limited, ways to press for reform. Activist shareholders have
sought shareholder votes on proposals aimed at increasing board
diversity-for example, proposals urging the adoption of formal
diversity policies, the nomination of women or minorities,
82 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 891-93 (Del. 1985).
83 Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1166 (Del. 1995)
(emphasis omitted).
84 As noted above, even when damages can be proven, statutory exculpation
provisions may prevent monetary judgments against directors except in cases of
egregious bad faith. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
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progress reports on diversification, or the disclosure of director
selection criteria.8 5  Because of the basic rule that directors
manage the corporation, however, shareholders have no power to
command directors to diversify the slates they nominate. Thus,
as will be explained below, shareholder proposals regarding
director action are usually made in non-binding form.
In large corporations, most shareholders vote through the
proxy process. This system resembles voting by absentee ballot
in political elections but with some significant differences.
Before elections take place, incumbent corporate management
produces and mails to shareholders a package including the
annual report, management's partisan description of the offices
and issues to be voted upon, and a proxy card. The vast majority
of shareholders will not personally attend the shareholder
meeting at which the election will take place. By providing a
shareholder with a proxy card, management asks that a
shareholder give management the power to cast her votes.
Thus, contacting shareholders to solicit their proxies is
crucial to success in a corporate election. Shareholders are often
scattered around the world. The board of directors has easy
access to the corporation's lists of shareholder names and
addresses and uses the corporation's funds to print and send the
official corporate proxy mailing. 86 SEC rules give shareholders
some opportunity to air their concerns throughout the corporate
proxy mailing process. Under SEC Rule 14a-8, the corporation
must include certain types of shareholder proposals in its proxy
mailings.87 This rule significantly reduces shareholders' costs in
communicating with other shareholders and thus facilitates
putting policy proposals to a shareholder vote.
Unfortunately, Rule 14a-8 is qualified with significant
limitations on the shareholders' right to proxy access. The
corporation may invoke one or more of those limitations as
grounds to exclude a proposal from the corporate proxy. Some of
these limitations are formal and procedural. For example, at the
time she submits a proposal, a shareholder must have owned at
85 See Dallas, supra note 7, at 1384.
86 See Gevurtz, supra note 61, at 206 (stating that because corporations are
required to notify shareholders of the meeting, they will bear the cost of mailing the
information directly to the shareholders).
87 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2003) (discussing when a company must include
shareholder proposals in its proxy statement).
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least $2000 worth of voting stock in the corporation, or 1% of the
voting stock, for at least one year.88 Other limitations go to the
substance of the proposal. For example, 14a-8(i)(1) states that in
order to be included on the corporate proxy, a proposal must
concern "a proper subject for action by shareholders" under the
laws of the state of incorporation. 9  While this may seem
uncontroversial, it underscores the fact that, despite the federal
rule of shareholder proxy access, state laws limit shareholders'
powers to set corporate policy. Under state law, the directors,
not the shareholders, run the corporation. 90  The SEC has
inserted a note, after the text of the rule, warning that
shareholder proposals that intend to have a binding effect on the
corporation may be improper under state law and further
recommends that shareholders should phrase their proposals as
"recommendations or suggestions. '" 91 Thus, in order to remove
any doubt as to whether the subject of a proposal is proper,
shareholder proposals submitted to a vote usually take this
precatory form. 92  As a result, diversity activism through
shareholder proposals is likely to consist of campaigns asking the
board to make an effort to diversify itself.
Assuming a non-binding proposal were placed on the proxy
and approved by shareholders, directors might feel some market
pressure to respond; however, they would be legally entitled to
ignore it.93  For example, a majority of Apple Computer
shareholders recently voted for a proposal urging management
to count options awarded to executives as an expense in its
accounting. 94 Generally Accepted Accounting Principles do not
require companies to do this, and most do not.95 After the vote,
88 § 240.14a-8(b)(1).
89 § 240.14a-8(i)(1).
90 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001); see also supra note 59 and
accompanying text.
91 § 240.14a-8(i)(1), note to para. (i)(1).
92 See GEVURTZ, supra note 61, at 267.
93 See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-
Adopted By-Laws: Taking Back the Street? 73 TUL. L. REV. 409, 421-22 (1998).
94 See Ian Fried, Apple Vote: Treat Options as Expenses, CNET NEWS.COM (Apr.
24, 2003), at http://news.com.com/2100-1047_3-998279.html (last visited Sept. 30,
2003).
95 See David Millon, Why Is Corporate Management Obsessed with Quarterly
Earnings and What Should Be Done About It?, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 890, 916(2002) ("Under current accounting principles, options need only be expensed if and
when they are actually exercised.").
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Apple management immediately stated that it would not comply
with the proposal. 96 Boards might feel even more confident in
ignoring shareholder proposals urging diversity. Unlike
expensing options, board diversity is not currently perceived as a
pressing issue related to corporate integrity and shareholder
value. Furthermore, an individual corporation will not feel great
pressure to respond to a diversity proposal, since the vast
majority of corporations do nothing to pursue board diversity.
Although both state law and Rule 14a-8 limit shareholders'
ability to bind the board, most state corporate codes also
empower shareholders to initiate and approve amendments to
the corporate bylaws. 97 Thus, shareholder proposals to amend
the bylaws appear to be "proper" under state law. Shareholders
could conceivably use the corporate proxy to propose and approve
a bylaw amendment imposing some diversity requirements on
the board. May shareholders use bylaw amendments to order
directors to take specific actions? In the diversity context, would
state law permit shareholders to propose a bylaw amendment
requiring the board to include persons of color, or a specific
person of color, in its slate of director nominees? Such a use of
the shareholders' power to amend bylaws is in tension with the
principle that directors, not shareholders, manage the
corporation. 98 This conflict remains unresolved in most states,
including Delaware. 99
96 See Tom Petruno, Investors Flex Muscles as Shareholder Activists, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, May 23, 2003, at H1.
97 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2001). A corporation's charter can
give the board concurrent power to amend the bylaws, but such a provision does not
take away the shareholders' power to do so. This "raises an intriguing prospect for a
cartoon-like exchange of amendment and counter-amendment." GEVURTZ, supra
note 61, at 197, n.77.
98 See GEVURTZ, supra note 61, at 198.
99 The exception is Oklahoma, whose supreme court has resolved the tension in
favor of shareholders, at least in the context of anti-takeover devices. See Int'l Bhd.
of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Companies, 975 P.2d 907 (Okla. 1999); see also
GEVURTZ, supra note 61, at 197-98 (discussing Fleming); Hamermesh, supra note
93, at 421-24 (summarizing Fleming and the issues involved). The Fleming court
held it is proper under Oklahoma law for shareholders to use a bylaw amendment
prohibiting the board from enacting "poison pill" takeover defenses and requiring
the board to redeem stock options already issued as part of a poison pill. The court
rejected the board's argument that the bylaw amendment would encroach on the
directors' power, including specific statutory authority to issue options. Fleming,
975 P.2d at 913. It is unclear whether the decision is limited to the poison pill
context. Moreover, even if interpreted broadly, the significance of the decision is in
doubt, because Oklahoma is not a leading corporate jurisdiction. The issue has not
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However, it should be noted that even if a diversity-related
proposal were proper under state law and satisfied Rule 14a-
8(i)(1), the board might invoke other sections of the rule in an
attempt to exclude the proposal from the corporate proxy. Under
Rule 14a-8(i)(8), for example, the board may exclude a proposal
that "relates to an election for membership on the company's
board of directors." 100 In practice, the SEC has interpreted this
Election Exclusion Rule to permit many shareholder proposals
regarding election procedures, as opposed to the election of
specific candidates.10  Thus, a diversity-related proposal,
whether a recommendation or a bylaw, may not call for the
nomination of any particular minority candidate. Rather, it
should address reforming procedures for nominating minority
candidates. The devil is, of course, in the details of devising such
procedures.
The exact parameters of the election exclusion are unclear.
The SEC has allowed corporations to apply the exclusion to
proposals, including precatory proposals, that, on their face, deal
with general election procedure or governing structure but might
in effect concern a specific candidate in an upcoming election.
For example, the SEC permitted AT&T Corporation to exclude a
precatory proposal asking the board to adopt a rule prohibiting
the CEO from serving as chairman of the board. AT&T had
argued that the proposal related to a specific election because it
sought to disqualify the incumbent CEO, who was also the
been adjudicated in Delaware. See Roberta Romano, Less Is More: Making
Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18
YALE J. REG. 174, 186-87 (2001).
100 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8) (2003).
101 See Citigroup, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 534, at
*12-14 (Apr. 14, 2003) (AFSCME Inquiry Letter, citing previous SEC decisions)
(stating that the exclusion has not been construed to permit the omission of
proposals relating to the "process which candidates are nominated").
Many interpretive issues regarding 14a-8 and other securities regulations are
not litigated. In many cases, a corporation will inform the SEC of its intention to
exclude a proposal under 14a-8 and ask the SEC for a "no-action letter" assuring the
corporation that the SEC will not pursue regulatory action. Although meant to be
informal, these letters are often cited for precedential value due to the lack of other
authority. The letters are often cryptic, in that the SEC rarely gives detailed
explanations of its decision not to pursue action. The propriety of using the letters
as precedent is open to question. See Donna M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on
Regulatory Interpretations in SEC No-Action Letters: Current Problems and a
Proposed Framework, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 921, 923-24 (1998).
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chairman, from renomination to the board in the next election. 10 2
In some cases, the effect of a diversity proposal could arguably
resemble that of the resolution excluded by AT&T. A proposal
requiring diversification of a homogeneous board would
necessarily involve nominating new candidates in the next
election and could thus entail the exclusion of an incumbent
from the next slate.
This discussion of shareholder proposals for director
diversity has thus far avoided the fundamental question of the
exact substance of a proposal. It is quite difficult to imagine how
to craft a proposal with real teeth. In today's political climate,
proposals imposing quotas of minority nominees would almost
certainly fail to gain majority shareholder approval. 10 3 As noted
above, a proposal might amend the corporate bylaws to include
requirements of diversity policies, placement goals, and
reporting on hiring. These might resemble requirements under
federal affirmative action guidelines for government
contractors.104 Shareholders, however, are unlikely to have the
resources or expertise necessary to monitor and administer such
requirements. A large and sophisticated government apparatus
monitors federal guidelines, and nonetheless, government
contractors are often slow to achieve diversity. 105
102 AT&T Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2001 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 213, at *1,
26-29 (Feb. 13, 2001).
103 See supra text accompanying notes 3-5 (discussing Norwegian and Israeli
laws requiring gender diversity on boards and the improbability that the U.S. will
adopt an analogous rule to address racial diversity).
104 See 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1 to 60-999 (2002). As noted above, if a corporation is a
federal contractor, it is already subject to these guidelines; whether they apply to
the nomination of directors, however, is unclear. Diversity activists might attempt
to bring the issue to the government's attention. Given the Bush Administration's
declared support of the anti-affirmative action plaintiffs in Grutter and Gratz,
however, it is unlikely that they would find a sympathetic audience. See President
George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on the Michigan Affirmative Action
Case (Jan. 15, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2003/01/20030115-7.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2003).
105 See generally West, supra note 5 (documenting that universities that are
federal contractors subject to affirmative action guidelines fail to achieve parity in
hiring and promoting women).
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C. Exercising Shareholder Voice by Contesting Elections
1. Impediments to Election Contests
The legal and institutional structure of shareholder voting
severely hinders shareholders' ability to nominate alternative
director candidates. Even in the rare instances where an
election is contested, the corporation is not required to list the
names of challengers on the proxy. As discussed above, Rule
14a-8(i)(8) allows management to exclude shareholder proposals
relating to specific elections. Thus shareholders fielding
opposition candidates have no right to have their candidates
included on the corporate proxy.
In order to solicit proxy votes for its alternative candidates,
the opposition must coordinate and shoulder the considerable
costs of its own independent proxy campaign. The costs of such a
campaign include not only printing and mailing, but also the cost
of insuring that the proxy solicitation complies with SEC
regulations. 106 As noted above, SEC regulations specifically
authorize management to exclude from its proxy mailings any
shareholder proposals that relate to director elections.107 Thus,
although the formal structure of corporate law empowers
shareholders to elect directors, shareholders have no right to use
the corporate proxy to contest elections. They may not place
alternative director candidates or even non-binding proposals
regarding candidates on the corporate ballot. In October 2003,
the SEC proposed limited exceptions to this rule, as will be
explained in section III.C.2 below.
Shareholders who wish to field an alternative slate must
bear the expense and effort of identifying candidates and
distributing their own proxies and informational materials to
thousands of shareholders. In order to solicit proxies, they will
have to obtain the list of shareholder names and addresses from
the corporation. Shareholders have the right to obtain this
list,108 but like any right, enforcement sometimes requires a
106 Douglas G. Smith, A Comparative Analysis of the Proxy Machinery in
Germany, Japan, and the United States: Implications for the Political Theory of
American Corporate Finance, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 145, 190-91 (1996).
107 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8) (2003).
108 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (2001). The statute requires the
shareholder to state a "proper purpose." The Delaware Supreme Court has held that
"the desire to solicit proxies for a slate of directors in opposition to management" is
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costly lawsuit. After obtaining the list, shareholders must pay to
print and mail thousands of proxies. 10 9 Once mailed, the proxy
may fail to receive shareholders' attention because it will lack
the authority of an "official" corporate mailing and may resemble
yet another unsolicited bit of junk mail.
Stock exchange rules regarding shares held in brokerage
accounts further tilt voting, whether on directorships or on
proposals, in favor of incumbent management. An individual
holding shares in an account typically does not own the shares so
much as she has a contractual claim against the brokerage firm
for a number of shares-much as a bank depositor owns no
currency but is contractually entitled to a certain amount of
money.110 The upshot is that the corporation's official records do
not reflect identities of many of these account holders. The
account holder, however, referred to as the "beneficial owner" of
the shares, is entitled to the rights of a shareholder including the
right to vote.
At election time, proxy materials are often sent to brokers.
The broker, as agent, is charged with asking the beneficial
owners for instructions on how to vote the proxy.' Brokers
often receive no response from beneficial owners, whether due to
the owners' apathy or the broker's lack of diligence in locating
the owner. When the beneficial owners do not provide
instructions, stock exchange rules allow corporations to empower
the brokers to vote the proxies themselves if the vote involves a
routine matter. 1 2 This practice is known as "broker voting."
such a purpose. Credit Bureau Reports, Inc. v. Credit Bureau of St. Paul, Inc., 290
A.2d 691, 692 (Del. 1972) (quoting Gen. Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., 240 A.2d 755,
756 (Del. 1968)). Shareholders have a similar right under SEC Rule 14a-7. Under
that rule, dissident shareholders who produce their own proxy mailings have a right
to have the corporation, at its option, mail the proxies at the shareholders' expense
or provide the dissident shareholders with the shareholder list. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-7.
109 Corporations sometimes reimburse successful insurgents for the cost of their
proxy campaigns. Some shareholders have challenged such reimbursements, but the
law in this area remains unclear. See GEVURTZ, supra note 61, at 206-08
(discussing cases).
110 See Thomas W. Joo, Who Watches the Watchers? The Securities Investor
Protection Act, Investor Confidence, and the Subsidization of Failure, 72 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1071, 1073 n.3 (1999).
1 If the broker lacks diligence or good recordkeeping, the beneficial owners
may never get the opportunity to vote their shares.
112 See [1984] 3 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2452, Rule 452; [2003] 2 Am. Stock Ex.
Guide (CCH) 9529, Rule 577.
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Brokers invariably exercise this power to vote in favor of
management. 113 A recent study examined elections in which
broker votes were believed to have provided the swing
shareholder votes to approve management-initiated proposals.
Institutional Shareholder Services, the leading independent
shareholder advisory firm, recommended voting against 78
percent of those proposals. 114
Broker voting may seem unimportant in that it applies only
to "routine" matters. "Routine," however, does not mean
unimportant. Rather, the NYSE has a narrow list of "non-
routine" matters, and any matter not on that list is "routine."'" 5
Thus, many important matters, including amendments of bylaws
governing nomination procedures, would be classified as
"routine." "Routine" matters also include elections that are not
"contested." Once again, the terminology is misleading.
"Contested" elections are only those elections in which all
shareholder proxies are solicited by postal mail.116  Therefore,
elections in which dissidents solicit only the proxies of large
shareholders or where they solicit proxies over the Internet are
not considered "contested."11 7  The discounting of partial or
Internet proxy contests is particularly unfair in light of the high
cost of printing and mailing and the fact that dissident director
campaigns must bear their own costs. Broker voting was
apparently established to help reach a quorum, but the study
mentioned above found evidence suggesting it is no longer
necessary for that purpose.118 The practice has evolved into a
protective buffer for management and should be discontinued.
113 Jennifer E. Bethel & Stuart L. Gillan, The Impact of the Institutional and
Regulatory Environment on Shareholder Voting, 31 FIN. MGMT. 29, 33 (2002) ("In
1976, all 118 respondents in a survey of brokerage firms indicated they always
voted beneficial owners' uninstructed shares with management. In 1998, the SEC
polled six of the largest brokerage firms, all of which indicated they voted
uninstructed shares for management.").
114 Id. at 30.
115 See id. at 32.
116 See id. at 33; RR Donnelley Financial, RealCorporateLawyer.com, Dec. 2001,
http://www.realcorporatelawyer.com/ezine/EZineDecember2001.htm; Aaron Brown,
eRaider's NYSE Proposal to Redefine 'Contested' and 'Solicitation, Oct. 20, 2001,
http://www.eraider.com/article.cfm?topicID=31&catID=163&articleID=779 (last
visited Sept. 30, 2003).
117 See Bethel & Gillan, supra note 113, at 33.
118 Id. at 30. The study found that even without broker votes, the average
percentage of shares voted in corporate elections was well over seventy percent in
1998. A quorum is generally fifty percent. Id.
[Vol.77:735
THE MAZE OF CORPORATE DEMOCRACY
2. Expanding the Shareholder Role in Director Elections
Increasing shareholder ability to nominate candidates would
be the most direct way to challenge incumbent control over
elections. Opening up the nomination system would reduce
incumbent entrenchment and provide the opportunity for
activist shareholders to put minority candidates before the
shareholders. It also has obvious potential benefits to corporate
governance in general. As one Wall Street observer put it:
"C.E.O.s and corporate boards do respond to moral suasion and
bad publicity, even in the absence of legal consequences ... [b]ut
everyone would be better off if shareholders could rely less on
public agitation and more on real power."119 Such a change in
shareholder power, however, will require reform by the Congress
or the SEC. The current SEC interpretation of Rule 14a-8
prevents shareholders from using the corporate proxy to enact,
or even suggest, bylaw or charter amendments empowering
them to nominate directors. A recent attempt to do so was
thwarted when the SEC permitted several corporations to
exclude proposals from the corporate proxy on the basis of the
election exclusion. 120 Despite allowing the exclusions, the SEC
ordered a study of the director nomination system. That study,
completed in July 2003, produced a number of limited
recommendations for reform.' 2'
The proposals in question were part of a concerted campaign
by the American Federation of State, County and Municipal
Employees Pension Plan ("Pension Plan"). Late in 2002, the
Pension Plan sought to place election reform proposals on the
proxies of six corporations, including Citigroup and AOL-Time
Warner. The Pension Plan wanted the corporations to include
on future proxies the name of a director candidate nominated by
a shareholder or group of shareholders owning three percent or
more of a company's common stock. 122 In some cases, the
Pension Plan proposed a binding bylaw amendment. 123 In
119 James Surowiecki, To the Barricades, THE NEW YORKER, June 9, 2003, at
44.
120 See Citigroup, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 534, at
*1-2 (Apr. 14, 2003).
121 See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 47.
122 See id. at 1.
123 See Citigroup, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 534, at
*1-2.
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others, it made a precatory proposal urging the board to take the
necessary steps to achieve the reform. 124  The corporations
planned to exclude the proposals and asked the SEC for a no-
action letter on several grounds, including the election exclusion.
The SEC's Division of Corporation Finance ("Division")
granted the corporations' no-action requests. 125 As noted above,
the SEC has generally interpreted the election exclusion to
prohibit proposals regarding specific candidates but to allow
procedural proposals. With respect to both the Pension Plan's
proposed bylaw amendments and its non-binding proposals,
however, the SEC explained that "[t]here appears to be some
basis" to apply the election exclusion, because "the proposal,
rather than establishing procedures for nomination or
qualification generally, would establish a procedure that may
result in contested elections of directors."126 The Pension Plan
asked the SEC to review the Division's no-action position. 127
Even before the Pension Plan campaign began, pressure had
been building to increase shareholder access. Two separate
groups of shareholder activists had already filed public petitions
with the SEC to amend the election exclusion. 12 Although the
SEC chose not to review the Citigroup no-action letter, it
124 See, e.g., Wilshire Oil Co. of Texas, SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 483, at *1-8 (Mar. 28, 2003).
125 See id.; HEALTHSOUTH Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 346 (Mar. 10, 2003); AOL Time Warner Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003
SEC No-Act. LEXIS 284 (Feb. 28, 2003); Sears, Roebuck and Co., SEC No-Action
Letter, 2003 SEC No-Act. LEXIS. 285 (Feb. 28, 2003); Eastman Kodak Co., SEC No-
Action Letter, 2003 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 287 (Feb. 28, 2003); ExxonMobil Corp., SEC
No-Action Letter, 2003 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 289 (Feb. 28, 2003); Bank of New York
Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 350 (Feb. 28, 2003); Citigroup,
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 160 (Jan. 31, 2003).
126 The identical language appears in each of the no-action letters. See supra
note 125. The Division's use of the term "contested election" in this context is
distinct from the NYSE's use of the term with respect to broker proxy voting. See
supra text accompanying notes 115-17.
127 See Citigroup, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 534, at
1-3.
128 See Request for Rulemaking to Amend Rule 14a-8(i) to Allow Shareholder
Proposals To Elect Directors, submitted by The Committee of Concerned
Shareholders and James McRitchie, File No. 4-461 (Aug. 1, 2002); Request for
Rulemaking Concerning Corporate Elections, submitted by Deborah Pastor,
Portfolio Manager, eRaider.com Inc., File No. 4-465 (Sept. 24, 2002). Both petitions
are available on the SEC website at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions.shtml (last
visited Aug. 22, 2003). The SEC posted the petitions for public comment but did not
otherwise respond to them.
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directed the Division to review the nomination and election
process and propose possible changes to the proxy rules. 129 In
October 2003, the SEC proposed amendments to the proxy rules
that would require the corporation to list shareholder nominees
in the corporate proxy materials (the "Proxy Access
Requirement"), subject to a number of significant conditions. 130
These conditions are so restrictive that the procedure is unlikely
to be of much practical use in changing the composition of a
board.
The Proxy Access Requirement would be conditioned on
"triggering events" indicating "the company has been
unresponsive to security holder concerns as they relate to the
proxy process." 13 ' The two triggers would be (1) over thirty-five
percent of shares voted in a director election cast "withhold"
votes against one of the company's nominees; or (2) a majority of
shareholders approve a shareholder proposal requiring the
company to disclose shareholder nominees. 32 Even if one of the
triggers were tripped, the company would be required to list only
candidates nominated by a shareholder or group of shareholders
who have owned a total of over five percent of the company's
stock for at least two years.1 33 The rule would require the
disclosure of only one, two or three shareholder nominees,
depending on the size of the board.13 4 Finally, the triggers would
not make proxy access permanent: they would require the
company to list shareholder nominees only in elections held in
the succeeding calendar year. 135
Conditioning proxy access on triggering events would be a
significant restriction on nominations. The trigger requirement
misplaces the burden of proof. Because directors have nearly
complete control over nominations, the rule should presume that
shareholders need access to the corporate ballot rather than
129 See Citigroup, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 534, at
1-3.
130 See Proposed Rule: Security Holder Nominations, SEC Release No. 34-48626
(Oct. 14, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-48626.htm. As of this writing
(October 16, 2003), the SEC was about to submit the rules to a 60-day public
comment period. Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
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requiring dissidents to prove that need. The triggering events
suggested in the report are themselves successful proxy
campaigns. Thus, to gain ballot access, dissidents would first
have to successfully mount a trigger proxy campaign to
encourage "withhold" votes or pass a shareholder proposal. Even
under the best of circumstances, success in this trigger campaign
might take more than one attempt (i.e., more than one year,
because elections are held annually). Even if a trigger campaign
were to succeed, the dissidents would have to wait another year
to invoke the new access rule at the following election. Finally,
the threshold shareholding level of five percent and two years
would put nominations far beyond the reach of grassroots
activists and even of most institutional investors. According to
John Sweeney, head of the AFL-CIO, the high threshold "would
make it difficult for even the largest investors to [nominate
candidates] and impossible to do so in a timely manner."136
The proposed rule changes are too limited to have much
impact. If the SEC is serious about empowering shareholders,
the Division should reverse its interpretation that boards may
exclude shareholder proposals with respect to voting procedures
that "may result in contested elections of directors" 137-the
position that started the whole controversy. Recall that the
AFSCME Pension Plan did not originally seek a SEC rule
change. It sought an interpretation that would allow it to use
the mechanisms of corporate democracy to make changes to the
internal policies of corporations in which it owns shares. Unless
the Division's trigger proposal is accompanied by a
reinterpretation of the election exclusion, the SEC's proposed
rule changes (if passed) will become the ceiling for shareholder
access; shareholders will be unable to pass, or even propose,
internal rules granting greater access. This position obviously
stands corporate democracy on its head and conflicts openly with
the idea of corporate governance as a private relationship
between shareholders and management. The Division's report
acknowledged that under the Pension Plan's preferred
interpretation of Rule 14a-8's election exclusion, proposals could
"be drafted individually to reflect the make up of a particular
136 See Louis Lavelle, This Corporate Reform Falls Far Short, BusinessWeek
Online (October 10, 2003), http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/oct2003
/nf20031010_6139 _db042.htm.
137 See supra note and accompanying text.
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company as opposed to a 'one size fits all' access rule that applies
to all companies. ' 138 At the same time, however, the Division
expressed preference for a uniform rule over custom-tailored
rules for each company. 1 9
The basis for the Division's "contested election"
interpretation seems to be a preference for director control of
nominations. As the Pension Plan pointed out in its request for
review of the Citigroup no-action letter, the Division has not
permitted the exclusion of certain other proposals that would
establish nominally contested elections. For example,
shareholders have on multiple occasions made proposals
requesting the board to nominate two candidates for each board
seat. As recently as three weeks before the Citigroup no-action
letter, the Division ruled that the election exclusion does not
apply to such proposals. 40 Multiple nominees would necessarily
result in contested elections. In those proposals, however, all
contestants would be chosen by the incumbent board. Under the
Pension Plan's proposal, however, incumbent control over the
board could be truly contested-a result the SEC apparently
wants to avoid.
CONCLUSION
In all honesty, dissident success will remain extremely
difficult, even if all the reforms suggested in this Article are
enacted. Even if shareholders' access to the corporate proxy for
proposals and nominations was to increase dramatically,
proposals and candidates would of course need to win
shareholder votes. This is notoriously difficult because
shareholders who are frustrated with management often find it
quicker and easier to sell their shares than to wait for the
138 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 47 at 29.
139 See id. at 30.
140 See Hewlett-Packard Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
52, at *1 (Jan. 10, 2003). See also SBC Communications, SEC No-Action Letter,
2001 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 185, at *1 (Jan. 31, 2001); Citicorp, SEC No-Action Letter,
1994 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 56 at *1-2 (Jan. 4, 1994) (rendering this interpretation
under former Rule 14a-8(c)(8), the predecessor to the present Rule 14a-8(i)(8)).
Ironically, Citicorp is the predecessor corporation to Citigroup. In the Hewlett
Packard letter, the Division rejected HP's exclusion attempt despite the
corporation's explicit invocation of the "contested election" rule. See Hewlett-
Packard Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 52, at *15-20.
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change via the mechanisms of corporate governance. 141 This
means that the shareholder electorate will tend to favor
incumbent management. In the post-Enron market, however,
shareholders may be less trusting of incumbents. Moreover,
even if it is true that shareholders tend to favor incumbents and
do not value diversity, incumbents should have to prove this
periodically in fair, contested elections.
Shareholder activists should combine nominations and
proposals with other forms of pressure mentioned in this Article,
such as demands for corporate records regarding nominations
and even lawsuits in the most egregious cases of recalcitrance.
Although proxy reform is unlikely to produce a wave of victories
in contested elections, respectable showings by shareholder-
nominated directors or shareholder-initiated diversity proposals
will at least attract incumbent directors' attention, even if they
do not succeed-especially if combined with other forms of
pressure. In at least some cases, boards' nominating committees
might respond proactively in order to head off a credible threat
of disruption or embarrassment.
Diversity activists might find the most success with
corporations already seeking to establish an image of racial
sensitivity, such as those with a recent history of discrimination
or those attempting to cultivate a minority, progressive, or "hip"
consumer base. In addition, diversity activists should seek the
support of large institutional investors. Not only do they wield
more votes but some of them also have sufficient clout to put
direct and personal pressure on incumbent board members. In
particular, diversity activists should seek to bring the issue of
board diversity to the attention of institutional investors that are
historically relatively liberal or answerable to minority
constituents. 142 Certain institutional investors have a history of
141 See Joo, supra note 1, at 44-45.
142 The governing bodies of the New York City Employees' Retirement System
(NYCERS) and the California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS), for
example, include elected officials from electorates with large numbers of minorities.
The NYCERS Board of Trustees includes a representative of the Mayor, as well as
the City Comptroller, the Public Advocate, the heads of the three unions with the
largest participation in NYCERS, and the presidents of New York City's five
Boroughs. See NYCERS, Board of Trustees, http://www.nycers.org/about/Board.aspx
(last visited Aug. 22, 2003). State and local employees elect the Board members of
CalPERS. The State Treasurer and State Controller are ex officio members. See
CalPERS, Board of Administration, http://www.calpers.org/aboutboard/ board.htm
(last visited Aug. 22, 2003).
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fighting for diversity and other corporate social responsibility
agendas. A notable example is New York City Employees'
Retirement System (NYCERS), which in 1991 attempted to use
the proxy process to fight a corporation's policy of employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 143 Although
the SEC permitted the corporation to exclude NYCERS's
shareholder proposal, the subsequent public outcry eventually
led the SEC to reverse its position and announce a policy
favoring proposals that "raise significant social policy issues."144
Although the current tenor of racial politics does not bode
well for diversity mandates at the government level, the politics
of corporate law may improve the chances of using shareholder
voice to call for diversity at the level of individual corporations.
Proposals to expand shareholder power would have stood little
chance just a few years ago. Corporate governance reform has
political momentum today, however, particularly because the
shareholding class expanded so significantly in the 1990s and
was so badly disappointed as the millennium turned. For all the
current talk of corporate governance reform, corporate
democracy remains a myth. Relatively speaking, however, the
next few years may provide unusual opportunities for all aspects
of shareholder empowerment.
143 See NYCERS v. SEC, 45 F.3d 7, 9 (2d Cir. 1995).
144 SEC Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Release No. 40018,
WL 254809 (SEC) at *4 (May 21, 1998).
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